

Climate change experiment, a collective-risk social dilemma.

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Avoiding Climate Change is a collaborative action as well as one of the biggest collective problems that humans face today. We have to collaborate to stop the increase of greenhouse-gas emissions or limit the global warming. This collaboration makes us confront a dilemma in which people aims to achieve the balance between individual and collective good; the individual sacrifice benefits us all, while we face the uncertainty of not knowing what the rest of people is sacrificing. The collective-risk social dilemma represents this scenario. In it, participants have to contribute individually to reach a common target in order to prevent a globally dangerous situation. To experience the collective-risk social dilemma, we present the Climate Game, a participatory experiment that sheds light into how people contribute collaboratively against climate change. A group of people is faced with the challenge of reaching a fixed target through successive monetary contributions. Under high risk of losing the remaining money if they do not reach the fixed target, the level of collaboration is very high. If we introduce inequality to the endowments, for instance simulating poor and rich countries in a negotiation table, we observe significant difference in the behaviour between poor and rich participants. Finally we represent individual strategies to achieve a global target. Therefore, we could offer an insight into the different behavioural attitudes while collaborating to prevent a global danger such as climate change.

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